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Abstract
This paper offers an account of the possibility for
a system of normative ethics in a later Wittgensteinean
epistemological context. By adopting a viewpoint of ethics as
fundamentally grounded in ‘practical identities’ as the source
of normative obligations in a manner expressed by thinkers
such as Christine Korsgaard, the paper attempts to clarify and
surpass the quietist and unanalyzable ethical account given
by Wittgenstein himself. Such an approach based on identity
largely mirrors the normative possibilities in speech offered
by ‘forms of life’ in Philosophical Investigations by offering
in-context, normatively rich frameworks in which ethical
statements can be adequately and normatively assessed.
Such a viewpoint accounts for the accepted disagreement in
Wittgenstein’s ethical thoughts by showing the in-context,
identity-based ‘form of life’ differences that lead to acceptable
ethical divergence, while also opening up room for semiuniversal bedrock ethical statements that all humans in a
given social community necessarily are subject to due to
the basic identities implied in being a human being for their
community. Such an account introduces more clarity to the way
that ethical deliberation and disagreement takes shape from a
Wittgensteinian perspective.
Introduction
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein destroys the
determinacy of meaning in language that was and seemingly
still is taken as a given by most people when thinking
philosophically, creating a great skeptical problem for anyone
wanting to adequately communicate with those around them.
Luckily for anyone who wants to use language, Wittgenstein
believes that there is a social solution to this problem and
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seems to claim that normative standards for meaning in
language do exist. There are various interpretations of exactly
what Wittgenstein’s solution involves, but at its base it goes
something like this: “Although there may not be a deeply
philosophically analyzable absolute meaning of any given
sentence, when used in practice by members of a shared social
community, the terms gain normative meaning.” Thus, the
members of a community can communicate with each-other,
and in those contexts, there are normative standards of correct
and incorrect usages of language.
Although Wittgenstein believed in limited normativity
in the meaning of language, he never gave a clear account
of his ethical beliefs and specifically opposed any attempts
to create systems of ethics. Creating a system of ethics
seems to be an attempt to apply a rigid, constricting lens
onto a linguistic landscape incapable of handling such
rigidity. Thus, Wittgenstein only ever comments on ethics
as being an extremely personal subject, and a subject about
which great variation is to be accepted. As Anne-Marie
Christensen describes it, to Wittgenstein, a person’s “ethical
attitude” is “a form of personal worldview.” These personal
ethical worldviews may differ, and they may even differ
fundamentally. If they do differ, there is no sure way to resolve
the difference, as there is no shared standard to which they can
appeal; it is simply a clash between worldviews.
This account of moral disagreement leaves
Wittgenstein’s account of ethical disagreement in a position
somewhat similar to his account of the interactions between
separate linguistic communities. To Wittgenstein, determinacy
in language use only exists within the bounds of a specific
community. Thus, the way in which what is true and untrue
about the world is decided necessarily resides within
communities as well. There is no external measure to appeal
to. Nevertheless, when two linguistic communities meet, it
is possible that one community might critique the beliefs of
the other as inaccurate. It is even possible that a group would
internally critique itself, as has happened numerous times
in scientific and cultural revolutions. In these revolutions,
core assumptions about the way that things work have been
challenged and flipped on their heads. It seems that ethical
disagreement between two individuals for Wittgenstein lies in a
similar position. The disagreeing people simply have disparate
worldviews.
From these disparate worldviews, meaningful
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critique can happen. Wittgenstein even gives examples of
such discussions in an ethical context. That said, how such
meaningful critique is resolved goes unanswered, despite the
fact that it does, in fact, often resolve itself. There is nothing
in Wittgenstein’s philosophical arsenal (ethical or linguistic)
that can help us understand what might happen when two
members of separate linguistic communities or two people
with different ethical worldviews interact. There is no separate,
crystalline fact of the matter that they could appeal to in order
to resolve their disagreement. This lack is already worrying
to what we intuitively feel should be the case in interactions
between communities about scientific matters of fact, but in the
ethical scenario between two members of the same community
such a conclusion feels almost unacceptable. To have ethical
disagreement between two very close people shrouded in
such epistemic fog seems like it might be giving up more than
is needed and obscuring what is a coherent, if a bit difficult,
process for those involved.
In this paper, I will present a potential solution to this
problem. This solution will build a conception of moral decision
making using the concept of ‘practical identity’ provided by
Christine Korsgaard as an analogue to Wittgenstein’s forms of
life which he employs to understand normativity in general uses
of language. Such an approach might help in resolving some of
Wittgenstein’s ethical indeterminacy. Additionally, it will give a
useful analytic lens to understand both personal moral conflicts
and ethical disagreement. Using this lens, moral deliberation
and disagreement is revealed as not a vague interaction of
viewpoints clashing with each other that mysteriously and
inexplicably resolves itself, but rather a negotiation of identities
for the person/s involved.
Practical Identity
At the core of Korsgaard’s ethical theory is the claim
that all obligations are fundamentally a response to a threat
against one or more of our identities. These identities are what
Korsgaard calls “practical identities,” meaning that they aren’t
based on some deep metaphysical claim of identity as a thing
existing from a third person perspective and informed by the
Scientific World View, but rather a practical account of the way
that we experience deliberation from a first person perspective.
Regardless and independent of the existence or nonexistence
from a third-person perspective of some idealized Cartesian
self, the reality of our lived first person decision-making process
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is that “it is as if there were something over and above all of
your desires, something that is you, and that [deliberates and]
chooses which [desire] to act on.” It is this non-metaphysical,
practical you that makes up your overarching practical identity
as a person.
Such an approach of establishing practical identities
may seem like it does not mesh well with a Wittgensteinian
account of things. It may seem like it relies too much on some
a priori method of speculative reasoning that fails the test of
the private language argument (which I will explain shortly)
for lacking a criterion of correctness. This, however, is not
the case. In this argument, it seems to me that Korsgaard is
actually making a somewhat Wittgensteinian argument against
the classical Cartesian view of the self while simultaneously
maintaining the the deliberative agent self as a practically,
although not necessarily metaphysically, existent identity.
Obviously, the classical Cartesian view of the self is
flawed from a Wittgensteinian perspective; it posits a dualist
account of the world that quite blatantly assumes the existence
of a deeply and inherently private view of a self fundamentally
inaccessible to others. This conception fails the test presented
by Wittgenstein’s private language argument. According
to the private language argument, this self could not really
communicate with itself in such a private way, as would be no
external criterion of correctness it can appeal to. To illustrate
this, look at what we might normally do to see whether we’re
right or not. Say I want to know what the date is. Since we
are currently in a 2020 COVID world and the days all blend
together, I’m not 100% sure if my disposition to guess that
it’s December 19th is correct, so I decide to check the calendar
on my phone. After checking the calendar, I realize that I
am wrong. It is, in fact, December 20th. I needed an external
criterion of correctness to compare my internal disposition
to, or else I wouldn’t really know what was right. From this
base, Wittgenstein argues that such a private definition cannot
function. All that such a private definition could possibly
give would be a measure of whether the person who gave
the definition feels that they are using the term properly. That
isn’t much of a standard for truth at all; it’s not verifiable. All
real truth claims require an outside criterion of correctness
with which they can check. Thus, the metaphysically dualist
Cartesian account of selfhood is doomed to fail should we
accept Wittgenstein’s critique of private languages.
In contrast, Korsgaard’s account treats our decision
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making process as a fundamentally public and practical
matter. Korsgaard points out that we do, in fact, experience
a deliberative process as agents, one that is unified by our
identity and fundamentally relies on language as a tool for
representing our reasons. We do, in fact, order, encourage,
blame, obey, and punish ourselves, as Wittgenstein points
out. Our inner monologue is not simply real: it is also public.
If we were to share the language that we use with ourselves
in our deliberative process with others, they would be able
to understand it. Such a process is not a private one in the
sense of a private language, but merely in the sense that it is
a negotiation between parts of ourselves. We may or may not
choose to share this process with other people, but it happens
nonetheless using a publicly available language and employs
publicly shareable reasons. To deny that this account of identity
and agency is resting on an inherently public base would be
to deny that the reasons we use to justify our decisions are
public as well, which is blatantly false when further considered.
The deliberative process is inherently one of negotiation with
ourselves, and we can all explain our reasons as to why we
make the decisions we deliberated over. The results of this
personal deliberation provides us with reasons that we can and
do regularly share. I can explain my reasoning for a decision I
make to anyone, and although they might not agree with me,
we can certainly expect that they will understand me.
Identities of Obligation
In addition to having a single overarching practical
identity as a given individual, each individual also has many
smaller identities. Contingent practical identities such as ‘sister,’
‘doctor,’ or ‘Austrian citizen’ each come with their own sociallydetermined reasons to do certain things and not do others.
A good doctor ought to spend time developing their medical
knowledge and ought not to harm their patient, for example.
Everyone also necessarily shares their identity as
deliberative and social beings who need the social context
provided by their contingent identities to motivate their
decisions and live a meaningful life. In our specific case, this
identity can be referred to as our human identity. This human
identity, being the base upon which our other identities stand,
also provides normative force to our other, contingent identities.
Additionally, it can not be given up without dire consequences,
as to give it up would be to give up our capability for identity
and thus deprive us of our reasons for action. This is why
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we might say that someone “lost themselves” in rage if they
kill someone in a murder of passion; they have temporarily
snapped out of their identity as human. Other identities can
also approach a similar level of importance in our lives when
we become very attached to them. Someone might choose to
die rather than betray their country’s interests because to do
so would be to forsake a national identity that they’ve made
so core to their being that dying is preferable to betraying
it. Ethical decision-making then involves the deliberative
negotiation between our identities and the situations and
urges we face in living our lives. For example, a man might
face a conflict of identity when his family refuses to invite his
boyfriend to a family gathering due to their bigoted beliefs
around sexuality. In this situation, the man must decide
between an obligation from his identity as a member of his
family and an obligation from his identity as a lover and a gay
man (among others).
If someone makes decisions that clash with one of their
identities, then that identity is threatened. If they either make
enough decisions against that identity, or a decision that directly
rules out that identity, then they lose the identity completely.
For an example of losing the identity through making enough
decisions against it, imagine someone who identifies as a
tea enthusiast. If that person suddenly starts choosing coffee
over tea every morning for a week, then their identity as a tea
enthusiast is threatened, and they and the people around them
might start questioning it. “Hey,” a friend might say, “Why did
you stop drinking tea all of the sudden? You drank it every
morning before last week!” If such behavior continues for six
months, then calling that person a tea enthusiast seems to no
longer be applicable, and a friend might call them out on it if
they still insist that they are. “I haven’t seen you drink tea in
half a year with no good excuse! How can you still claim to be a
tea enthusiast!” An example of a decision that instantly destroys
an identity might be one of someone identifying as a member
of their school’s board game club. If they quit the club, then that
identity is instantly destroyed. In almost all cases, it would be
incorrect to continue claiming that you’re a part of board game
club if you’ve formally quit, and the people around them could
also call them out on that. “Stop saying you’re a part of the
board game club! You told everyone you quit!”
As you can see by these examples, identities are
fundamentally public entities. In the social contexts where
a given set of identities is used, they have their meaning by
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dint of the standards set within that social context, and there
are normative standards one must achieve in order to claim
membership in those identity groups. In a society without
music, you cannot identify as a musician. Similarly, the honor
code of a knight during the Middle Ages will be different than
the honor code of a baseball player in our modern day, even
though they would likely both identify as honorable. The
existence of these identities is determined by the shared social
world in which they’re used. The contents of these identities
(i.e. the reasons and obligations they give you), as well as the
criterion under which you can claim ownership to them is
mediated through this inherently public social lens as well.
Korsgaard employs this account of practical identity
to offer a compelling Kantian account of what such decisionmaking necessarily looks like. That said, Korsgaard employs
many claims that a Wittgensteinian perspective might reject in
constructing her account of morality building off of this base.
Regardless, the starting point of practical identity itself is really
what has important implications for pulling back a bit at some
of the vagueness present in Wittgenstein’s account of morality.
Non-Kantian approaches could certainly be built from the base
of obligation that the conception of practical identity provides.
Identities and Forms of Life
One of the terms often discussed in explanations of
Wittgenstein’s conception of linguistic normativity is the
term Lebensform, or “form of life.” Although Wittgenstein
himself doesn’t use the term to any truly great extent, it is an
illuminating term for understanding the type of scenarios in
which a language has normative meaning. To Wittgenstein,
language only gains normative meaning within a given
embodied context. Here’s how I like to think of it: language
cannot be understood in isolation, but requires two levels
of context. The first context is a social one. You must be
indoctrinated into a community that speaks a shared language
in shared contexts before you can adequately understand the
language in use. The second context is a teleological one. You
must employ the language in a specific context of use before
it can be adequately understood. Both of these contexts are
intertwined, with no hard barrier between them. You cannot
understand any given use of language without both.
An example of a form of life can be seen in the
institution of a grocery store and the many activities that you
engage in within it. For example, imagine a woman bringing
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her big cart of items to the checkout lane. In the cart, she has
oats from the bulk section, some produce, and tofu. She begins
placing her items on the conveyor belt, and eventually the
cashier gets to her oats and asks her “What’s the code for that?”
The woman replies “GE30.” This situation requires both that
the woman buying groceries and the cashier have the cultural
knowledge of how supermarkets work, the process of checking
out, and the special process of exchanging codes for items from
the bulk section in order to understand how the language is to
be used in that specific situation. In a different situation with
different context, such language would have absolutely no
meaning, or a completely different one. Asking “What’s the
code for that?” has completely different meaning as a software
programmer, or a spy learning how to communicate using
a cypher. Without knowing the specific context, you cannot
understand the specific utterances and follow the language
game properly. These cultural and teleological contexts are
what make up forms of life.
Wittgenstein’s example of a language game between two
builders in section two of Philosophical Investigations can also
be analyzed from this form of life perspective. In the example,
two people are conversing in a very simple language consisting
solely of words of construction materials, such as ‘slab.’ One
builder will yell ‘slab!’ at the other, and the other builder will go
and fetch them a slab. The language of Wittgenstein’s builders
from section two has meaning in part because they’re using it in
the context of a specific activity. That said, if you take one of the
builders out and replace them with someone without the social
conditioning and training to be a member of their constructionworker community, they won’t have the social context to know
what’s going on and understand the teleological context they’ve
been placed in. If you lack a part of the context required to
participate in the form of life that a language is being used in,
then you won’t be able to adequately understand the use of
language you’re engaging in. For Wittgenstein, language is to
be understood in use.
In the case of the builders, the fact that they live in a
form of life as members in a construction-worker community
seems to express nearly the same meaning as saying that
they are construction workers. It is their entrance into that
community that allows them to identify as construction
workers, and people who can properly assert that they hold the
identity of construction worker can reasonably be expected to
understand the language games that construction workers play.
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Identity, in the sense of practical identity as given by Korsgaard,
seems to bear resemblance to the concept of a form of life. Our
practical identities give us structure around which we can
shape the contours of our life, they give us reasons to make
both mundane and profound decisions in our life, and they
give us boundaries within which we must mostly abide unless
we want to feel the guilt of losing our sense of self. They give
us teleological reasons that we should strive for and a social
context in which we live. In a quite real sense, our identities
express the literal form that our life takes.
Ethical Theories
As forms of life give normativity to language, so too
can identities give normativity to ethical expression and
ethical language. Although such a conception of identity as
the normative scope through which we can evaluate language
would necessarily seem to create a theory of ethics, something
Wittgenstein was quite blatantly against, the rigidity of
the system springing from this theory is not extreme. In
many cases, the account offered by Wittgenstein of differing
worldviews does not greatly differ from such an identity-based
account. That said, the lens of identity can offer more clarity to
the situation.
To illuminate this, let’s take a look at an example used
by Christensen in her account of Wittgenstein’s ethics taken
from a conversation between Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees. In
their conversation, Wittgenstein and Rhees discuss “a man ‘who
has come to the conclusion that he must either leave his wife
or abandon his work within cancer research.’” Wittgenstein
responds: “[s]uppose I am his friend, and I say to him ‘look,
you’ve taken this girl out of her home, and now, by God, you
must stick to her.’ This would be called taking up an ethical
attitude.” He also notes that the man might respond “but what
of suffering humanity? how [sic] can I abandon my research?”
Wittgenstein even notes that the man might consider his wife
“’It probably won’t be fatal for her. She’ll get over it, probably
marry again,’ and so on.” All of these are referring to different
‘ethical attitudes’ that the man could take up in defending his
actions, and Wittgenstein is okay with that.
All of these ‘ethical attitudes’ are just as easily expressed
in terms of identity. In the first case, Wittgenstein is appealing
to the man’s identity as a husband and the duties that come
with marriage. In the second case, the man is responding with
the reasons given to him by his identity as a cancer scientist and
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someone whose work brings good into the world. In the final
case, the man is qualifying the harm done to his wife by arguing
that she can handle the destruction of her identity as his wife.
To Wittgenstein, all of these responses are theoretically valid,
and under an identity-based system they are as well. As we can
see here, although a practical-identity based theory of ethics is
certainly a theory, its system need not be excessively rigid in its
reach. Each of these identities place valid claims on the scientist
in question. The ‘theory’ I offer in this paper is really more a
method to add more clarity to the nature of Wittgensteinian
ethics than any substantive change in the contents of it.
Nonetheless, there are places where a practical-identity
based system of ethics does impose seemingly universal rules
upon us, and those cases come into play when our identity as
human is threatened by an action that we might take. To give
up our identity as human would be to give up our very nature
as a social, deliberative animal in need of having sociallydefined identities which obligate and motivate us. To give up
our human identity would be to give up the base groundwork
that enables us to exist and be ethical creatures in the first place.
It is thus impossible to give up our human identity without
in some moral way dying and losing our membership in our
community. The standards set by this identity as human are
the ethical standards accepted as so right that to question them
would be crazy, and to act against them would be to commit an
‘inhuman’ deed.
Non-negotiable Obligation
One example of such a non-negotiable, ‘human’
obligation would Korsgaard’s account of a conflict between
one’s identity as a solider and their identity as human. While a
good soldier should follow the orders of their superiors, a good
human should not murder the innocent. In such a situation, the
identity of humanity overrides any contingent identity, as to
lose it would be to lose the self.
The identity as human could be considered as giving
us a group of unquestionable, certain statements from a
Wittgensteinean point of view presented in On Certainty. Such
certain statements are basic assumptions that we act on in
normal life, and it does not make sense to doubt them in almost
all contexts. The identity of human comprises obligations so
basic and fundamental to our conceptions of morality that they
are unquestioned for most people outside of truly exceptional
circumstances. For example, behaviors like killing another
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human being for fun or causing completely arbitrary harm to a
person can be quite simply taken as bedrock immoral actions in
our society. These statements could be questioned theoretically,
but practically are taken as a given. In the process of ethical
deliberation with someone who tried to question one of these
bedrock statements of ethical life, many would simply dismiss
them as insane.
Imagine, for example, two people entering an ethical
debate about the permissibility of some hotly debated topic,
say the practice of eating meat. Perhaps the argument of the
person insisting that people should not eat meat may take
Peter Singer’s perspective and explain that animals are sentient
beings just like us who can experience pain just like we do,
and that we have no good reasons to inflict such pain on those
other animals. From an identity perspective, this could be seen
as appealing to our identity as a sentient being who also avoids
pain. If their interlocutor were to simply respond “Well, I don’t
see anything wrong with causing pain to other human people
anyways, why should I care about animals’ pain?”, then the
conversation would be brought to a standstill. Their argument
is inhuman. It is making a claim so contrary to the base moral
assumptions that we share that it becomes almost impossible
to engage with them. In these situations, what they’re saying
is just so absurd that to argue with it no longer makes sense.
They seem to not be a member of our linguistic and ethical
community. When these statements are questioned, we may
have exhausted our justifications and ‘reached bedrock with our
spades turned.’ Perhaps the only answer here is to say “That
claim is simply wrong.”
The Limitations of This View
When I originally set out to write this article, I had much
more lofty goals. I wanted to introduce universally normative
statements within Wittgenstein’s epistemic framework.
Unfortunately, such a goal has proven to be untenable. It
seems impossible to push the inherently limited epistemic
framework adopted by Wittgenstein to accept any standard
of truth that would extend beyond the reach of one languageusing community. Such a conclusion is certainly painful for
anyone aspiring to universal truth in ethics, especially given
how persuasive Wittgenstein’s argumentation is. That said, if
such a viewpoint is all that a careful and honest analysis of the
epistemic situation allows, then we are obligated to adopt it.
The largest reason that I am quite unhappy with this
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result is that it maintains the weirdness that is inherent in
Wittgenstein’s epistemic system. How are we to adequately
account for what happens when two completely separate
language-using communities meet with each other? The
communities have totally separate normative standards of
truth, yet supposedly something will happen in their interaction,
and one view will come out on top. It seems that here we are
necessarily forced into one of two directions. The first possible
route would be to accept that all truth standards are equally
good, and that in such scenarios each community is equally
right. This would be taking a relativist perspective. The second
option would be to reject the very idea of truth in an absolute
sense, claiming that from an outside perspective, to say that
either community is really right would simply be a misuse of
language. There is no criterion of correctness to be had from
this outside perspective. This seems to be this position that
Wittgenstein takes, rather than the relativist one. Such an
account represents the destruction of the ‘capital T’ Truth. At
the very least, it is a claim that argument about such a truth is
altogether impossible (how one could adequately argue for the
existence of such a truth from this framework is beyond me).
Such a conclusion is deeply disappointing, especially in the
context of ethics, where it seems to take some of the weight out
of an area of life which you are expected to make significant
sacrifices for.
Conclusion
Limitations in mind, the framework expressed in
this paper does accomplish a somewhat significant step in
improving the tools of analysis that we have when discussing
ethical disagreement from a Wittgensteinian epistemic
perspective. Under Wittgenstein’s perspective, differences in
worldview are just that: not analyzable in a systematic way and
philosophically non-navigable. By offering an account of how
practical identities are meaningfully similar in (giving context
to moral obligation) to the way that forms of life give context
to other linguistic expressions, I have enabled a somewhat
comparable level of analysis of ethical statements to other
linguistic contexts under a Wittgensteinian framework.
The account offered here is certainly not a complete
one. It still has a few rough edges. Specifically, I think that there
is still room to improve the account of obligation from our
identity as human that is offered in this paper. The claim that
our identity as human is in some way basic makes sense even
58

EPISTEME XXXII

within a Wittgensteinian framework. To call some person or
action inhuman seems to be about the strongest ethical critique
we have available. That said, the claims about our human
identity being the base upon which all other identities build
and the idea of what is essentially a human ‘species being’ as a
social creature in need of identity are perhaps a bit out of place
in a Wittgensteinian system. This is despite the fact that ethical
bedrock claims do undoubtedly exist. Perhaps the structure
they have been fit in within this paper is simply a bit too rigid.
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